No. of Recommendations: 8
This BTW is what you do when somebody sits there and shoots at you repeatedly. What you don't do is have your valuable ships sit out there waiting for some loser to get lucky and sink one of them. THAT was a waste of time and materiel.But it didn't work. Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea weren't
ended by that strike. They didn't stop until the Gaza ceasefire was entered into:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_attacks_on_co...Remind me who controls their oil flows now. Right - that's us. Had we not done anything to Maduro we wouldn't have this level to pull.We could have done the same thing with Maduro. Impose a full blockade of oil tankers - and then offer to release the sanctions against Venezuela and remove all the pressure to have him step down? Just in exchange for having us volunteer to be his broker? He would have taken that deal in a heartbeat.
Because we don't "control" their oil flows. We're acting as Venezuela's oil brokers, selling them to whoever wants to buy them. Again, it's the briar patch. We gain the
appearance of having a lot of control, and we get to wet our beak with a little fee (I'm sure) - but if we tried to cut off Venezuela from selling oil, we'd have to do it by force again.
de Silva is a communist. Meanwhile, Argentina, Peru, Panama, Bolivia all say hello.Last I checked, Brazil's more than twice the size of those countries -
combined. If I'm China, I would be happy with that trade-off.
Except it's not a trade-off. As noted in the other article, Argentina still has pretty decent relations with China - they just keep them as quiet as possible so as not to irritate the U.S. China's still got massive influence in the other large country, Peru - almost certainly stronger influence than the U.S., even with our renewed efforts to pull them more in our orbit:
China has been Peru's largest trading partner for more than a decade. In 2023, bilateral trade exceeded $35 billion, driven primarily by copper, iron ore and agricultural exports. Chinese companies control or hold major stakes in several of Peru's largest mining operations, including the Las Bambas copper mine.
A regional pattern with a Peruvian focal point
Peru is not alone in navigating this dynamic. Across Latin America, Chinese firms have secured major roles in strategic infrastructure, including port facilities in Panama, energy and mining assets in Ecuador, and extensive investments in Brazil's electricity transmission and agricultural sectors. What distinguishes Peru is the combination of large-scale mineral wealth and access to the Pacific, coupled with relative institutional stability -- attributes that make it a focal point for both global powers.
The most emblematic project is the Port of Chancay, a $3.5 billion deep-water megaport north of Lima. The project is led by the Chinese state-owned shipping giant COSCO, which holds a 60% controlling stake. Once fully operational, the port is expected to reduce shipping times between Peru and Asia by up to 10 days and position Peru as a major logistics hub for South America's Pacific coast.
Supporters view Chancay as transformative infrastructure that will enhance Peru's competitiveness and attract regional trade. Critics argue that the majority of foreign control over such a strategic maritime gateway raises legitimate concerns regarding sovereignty and national security. The debate is no longer simply economic; it is geopolitical.https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/17/latam-China-...But soft power is boring and doesn't make for exciting press conferences or use the word "warfighters" the way big military operations or special forces missions do.
