No. of Recommendations: 3
I didn't say it wouldn't do anything. I said that we don't have much ability to shape what comes afterwards.Why do you think Trump and Bibi keep saying it's up to the Iranians themselves now? We've no interest in replacing Tehran's government; they have to do that themselves.
Again, the strategic goals are
(a) Severely degrade/Eliminate Iran's ability to project power and/or destabilize the region
(b) Further isolate China and remove one of their vassal states, further putting pressure on their energy supplies.
Both objectives appear to have been met. There may be others.
But...have we? Again, we haven't changed the regime in Venezuela. We haven't made life tougher for China there. Maybe that's the goal going forward, but we haven't replaced the Venezuelan government with the opposition party, or a government more predisposed to be an ally of the U.S. Because we didn't have a replacement government on offer, we just kept the old one.Player, please. We waltzed into the middle of Venezuela and yanked their head of state away in the back of a helicopter. If we wanted to we could have killed him outright. We also eliminated some of the other more obnoxious henchmen he had down there.
Now it's Delcy Rodriguez's turn. Here's what's behind the doors for her:
Door #1: Keep pulling the same crap they've been pulling, and either get to read the serial numbers on a Hellfire missile right before it explodes -or- wind up in the jail wing next to Maduro.
Door #2: Keep her nose (relatively) clean, rebuff China and make noises/wave her hands in the direction of some kind of rational government in Venezuela...and maybe she gets to be a part of it.
One might say there's a Door #3 where she does the exact same things and we just sit there and do nothing about it. Is that right? Don't think that's an option here.
It's highly likely Rubio and co. have shown her what's behind Doors Number 1 and 2 and told her that it's in her best interest to take Door #2.
That's the same message that whoever takes over in Iran is going to get. Rational human beings take Door #2. If we get another Mullah in Iran, they'll take Door #1. In that case we need to see.
If we're limiting ourselves to air power, that's the most likely outcome in Iran right now as well - whoever comes after Khameini will be someone who's already got a considerable power base in the country and thus likely a part of the existing government. IOW, more on Team China than Team U.S.LOL. You think there aren't people on the ground in Iran? You need to look into this deeper, hahahaha. I didn't think it was possible to penetrate a country as thoroughly as Mossad has Iran. As I've said, the Iranian people themselves get a vote. There are reports of at least one city kicking out the IRGC.
Again - why do you keep thinking that any of this is true? We didn't change the government in Venezuela. We removed their leader, but the regime is otherwise entirely unchanged. How have they lost their main squeeze in South America? They lost influence in Argentina because the government in Argentina changed. But that didn't happen in Venezuela.You just refuse to believe anything, do you? Let me get this straight: You actually think we went through all the time and trouble of snatching Maduro and
didn't have The Talk with Delcy right afterwards?
Here's one way of looking at it:
https://beijingpost.com/america-s-venezuela-oil-gr...Washington says it will manage Venezuela’s oil sales and pricing while still allowing Chinese purchases—turning crude into a geopolitical control panel with global consequences.
The United States is signaling a new, unusually direct form of energy statecraft: controlling Venezuelan oil sales after the capture of Venezuela’s leader on January 3, while still allowing China to buy Venezuelan crude—so long as it’s priced at what U.S. officials call “fair market” levels and with a requirement that most volumes flow to the United States.
At face value, the policy tries to do three things at once: stabilize supply into U.S.-aligned channels, prevent discounted “debt-repayment pricing” that deepens China’s long-running energy foothold in Venezuela, and reset who gets to set terms in the Western Hemisphere’s most politically fraught oil story.
China has been Venezuela’s top oil buyer for years, including through debt-for-oil arrangements, so any forced repricing or routing of cargoes is not just a commercial tweak—it’s a strategic rebalance of influence.
The stakes extend beyond barrels.
Control over exports and pricing signals a broader trend: major powers increasingly treating commodity flows like governed infrastructure, not neutral trade.I think this piece gets a lot of it right. No more China buying sanctioned oil and then moving it near Malaysia to count it as "Malaysian" oil, lol.
I think that's the argument that you keep overlooking. The Administration took out Maduro, but that doesn't change the government much, and may end up having minimal impact on their relations with China. We've taken out Khameini, and we don't know who will be in charge of Iran going forward - and it may very well be someone who is just as eager to have positive relations with China as Khameini.No. You're arguing from the same assumption - that we just went and did things and didn't do any thinking of What Comes Next. I have no idea why you keep believing that literally everyone in Trump's government is a complete moron, but whatever. Weren't you just lecturing me on how it's super bad to assume others are complete idiots? There's far more evidence to indicate that AOC is partially brain dead than there is Rubio, Caine, or even Hegseth for that matter.
I think you're making some sophomoric assumptions about what's happening between China and various bad actors around the globe.Am I, now. One of us is reacting to events as they unfold and the other one of us keeps repeating the same opening premise ("We didn't really accomplish anything in Venezuela and probably won't in Iran")_ <--- that's the essence of what you're saying.
Never mind we've eliminated Iran's nuclear program, command structure, Navy and Air Force and are working on their missile and drone capabilities now. Never mind that we're basically telling who Venezuela can sell oil to now (and taking the ghost fleet off the waves).
No offense, but you're standing in the forest telling me about the tree canopy while you bend over and study some fern growing a foot off the ground.
From the above link:
Operationally, the early mechanics look like a hybrid of enforcement and logistics: U.S. naval and legal actions against tankers, combined with efforts to channel Venezuelan crude through established trading houses and refiners, are already affecting shipping patterns and expectations for China’s near-term intake.
Meanwhile, analysts warn that controlling barrels is the easy part; rebuilding output, managing infrastructure, and sustaining legal legitimacy are the hard parts—and the economics may disappoint anyone expecting quick, clean gains.That's right. China doesn't get to buy a bunch of oil at a discount any more. And it also ack's your point about rebuilding Venezuelan infrastructure.
Here's something else:
https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/where-china-...Look at Figure 1 and tell me who you *don't* see in this list of places China gets oil from. Then square that with this
The gap between Kpler’s data on China’s Iranian and Venezuelan crude imports and that of China’s GAC is because Iranian and Venezuelan barrels are relabeled to disguise their origins. Many Iranian and Venezuelan barrels that arrive in China are rebranded as Malaysian. China imports more “Malaysian” crude (1.3 million bpd in 2025) than Malaysia produces (535,000 bpd in 2024), and the waters off Malaysia are a hotbed of ship-to-ship (STS) oil transfers.Oh, and BTW.:
https://news.usni.org/2026/03/02/belgian-french-fo...Belgian military forces, supported by the French military, seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker Saturday in the North Sea as part of operation “Blue Intruder.”
MT Ethera was intercepted in the Belgian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) while sailing under a false Guinea flag, according to a Belgian Ministry of Defense news release published Sunday. Ethera was not entitled to free passage through the Belgian EEZ because under international law, it is illegal for a ship to sail under a false flag or without a flag, the release reads. The Belgian government greenlit the boarding of the tanker.
“The ship was sailing under a false flag and is on the European Union’s sanctions list. These are serious indications of deliberate deception and possible sanctions evasion. When such indications arise in our exclusive economic zone, we take action,” Belgium’s Defense Minister Theo Francken said in the release.A whole of folks are starting to be emboldened enough
to actually enforce international law. Why do you suppose that is? Did the notoriously steely-backboned French and Belgians just look the other way or was there some other reason?
