The question is whether the assumptions required for Berkshire to generate meaningful outperformance are actually supported by evidence. Given Berkshire’s size, its enormous capital base, the maturity of many of its businesses, and the change in capital allocator, I think those are entirely reasonable questions to ask.

Well stated. I agree.

I'll repeat a point I've made before, using XOM as an example. They understand they are a "Price Taker" in terms of prices. They don't control the commodity prices that dominate their business. In the same sense, BRK is a "Market Taker." They don't create new opportunities, they can only select from what the market offers. And they historically restrict themselves to large, established, businesses with a track record. They don't follow the path of large PE businesses of buy cheap, fix up, sell, and repeat. So BRK has an increasingly smaller Market from which to choose because of size and philosophy.

What Exxon has done is to massively reorganize their corporation, saving circa $16+ billion annually with identified paths to $20 billion by 2030. They are also creating new product lines from scratch, finding new uses for the hydrocarbons they possess and find. In one presentation, they expect profits from these new businesses to be equal to the whole fuels business by the mid-2030's.

Exxon could do this because their businesses are related, so much easier to combine and restructure. They also have an industry leading Technology organization focusing on both improving efficiencies in existing businesses and creating new ones.

BRK doesn't have these capabilities, You can't combine a railroad and an energy business to save money, they must restructure within themselves. Greg is making some progress in adding more structure within related businesses - necessary for significant future consolidations to reduce costs. And he's also pressuring on more competitive results from significant business segments. But, given the historic standalone structure of how BRK operates, it isn't going to be possible to reduce costs as significantly as Exxon. It's going to be a long, hard, grind. His job is far, far harder than that of the Exxon CEO. And there is the issue of preserving the Berkshire culture as judged by a hand selected board with two of Buffett's children.

What I've done is to follow Munger's advice and restructure my BRK expectations. Capital gains taxes from decades of ownership preclude portfolio changes. But that will not be an issue for much longer at my age - assuming step-ups still exist on passing. What I've told my family is maybe think of BRK as a tax deferred bond with some growth, and consider how much of the portfolio to keep. It actually has limited ability to change significantly unless it can more aggressively compete for investment, albeit at higher risk. Still, it's a good safe hold. And pressures are building for another financial crisis that could offer better market opportunities. I'm not giving up on BRK, but I am adjusting expectations.

OTOH, I think XOM will adapt to the emerging world as it has demonstrated. And that O&G will remain fundamental to civilization extending well into our grandchildren's lives. Maybe somewhere between a safe bond over time with some new growth opportunities.

Instead of saying "beating up on Greg" I should more accurately say "try to realistically understand where BRK is and what he faces."