Post New

I am sure we will all be reading closely, looking for something:

One fellow is hoping for a dividend.

Another for aggressive share repurchases.

Maybe dumping Davita. Or buying Tesla.

As for me, I am wishing that Greg has found his “Carol Loomis”, to help him refine and communicate his message. Whether he is feeding us ice cream or brussel sprouts, he should (must!) be clear and decisive. And readable, especially for the elderly aunts.

What would YOU consider a successful letter?

" One fellow is hoping for a dividend.

Another for aggressive share repurchases."


To be clear, it's a 100 to 1 shot that brk will declare a quarterly div prior to q-4, Buffett doesn't change his thinking that quickly.

I believe brk resumed buybacks below 480, I doubt they bought in size.


We shall see.

One fellow is hoping for a dividend.

Another for aggressive share repurchases.

Aggressive share repurchases if it makes sense on intrinsic value, yes. Right now it does not.

Or buying Tesla.

If Berkshire bought Tesla something has gone very, very wrong over there.

As for me, I am wishing that Greg has found his “Carol Loomis”, to help him refine and communicate his message. Whether he is feeding us ice cream or brussel sprouts, he should (must!) be clear and decisive. And readable, especially for the elderly aunts.

What would YOU consider a successful letter?

I agree, Greg probably has a skilled writer to help word-smith it. Hopefully he didn't run it through Chat GPT ;-)

A successful letter:
- business segments discussion as usual
- plans for business improvements (BHE, etc.)
- be clear about who is handling investments and what the philosophy is
- discuss the cash pile
- praise Warren and Charlie, Ajit, Todd

As for me, I am wishing that Greg has found his “Carol Loomis”, to help him refine and communicate his message.

Yes, that would be great. I really hope to see something written in a frank and blunt way rather than "management-ese". Not as if you'd run a bullish puff piece through a sell side broker, a management consultant, a PR department then two law firms.

For bonus points it would be great if it were more like the letters of 15-20 years ago, with each year typically delving into the economics of an operating division. Even when it's bad news.

Jim

I'd like a deep dive into electrical utilities. It seems like a number of interesting things happened there in the last year or two:
PacifiCorp's wind, natural gas, and distribution assets
Wildfire lawsuits
Renewed interest as an investment due to AI data center needs
Tension between rate payers and utilities looking to meet AI power use needs

Buffett deferred a lot to Greg at the Annual Meeting when the topic of wildfire lawsuits and the suitability of electrical utilities as investments came up, so I think a thoughtful written piece would be valuable.

https://avsport.org/microcomm/admin/busplan.pdf

I suspect many have read this already, but it is worth refreshing one's memory from time to time :-)

Jeff

Epiphyte Corp.’s business plan is about an inch thick, neither fat nor skinny as these things go. The interior pages are slickly and groovily desktop-published out of Avi’s laptop. The covers are rugged hand-laid paper of rice chaff, bamboo tailings, free-range hemp, and crystalline glacial meltwater made by wizened artisans operating out of a mist-shrouded temple hewn from living volcanic rock on some island known only to aerobically gifted, Spandex-sheathed Left Coast travel bores. An impressionistic map of the South China Sea has been dashed across these covers by molecularly reconstructed Ming Dynasty calligraphers using brushes of combed unicorn mane dipped into ink made by grinding down charcoal slabs fashioned by blind stylite monks from hand-charred fragments of the the True Cross.
The actual contents of the business plan hews to a logical structure straight out of the Principia Mathematica. Lesser entrepreneurs purchase business-plan-writing software: packages of boilerplate text and spreadsheets, craftily linked together so that you need only go through and fill in a few blanks. Avi and Beryl have written enough business plans between the two of them that they can smash them out from brute memory. Avi’s business plans tend to go something like this:

MISSION: At [name of company], it is our conviction that [to do the stuff we want to do] and to increase shareholder value are not merely complementary activities — they are inextricably linked.

PURPOSE: To increase shareholder value by [doing stuff].

EXTREMELY SERIOUS WARNING (printed out on a separate page, in red letters on a yellow background): Unless you are as smart as Johann Karl Friedrich Gauss, savvy as a half-blind Calcutta bootblack, tough as General William Tecumseh Sherman, rich as the Queen of England, emotionally resilient as a Red Sox fan, and as generally able to take care of yourself as the average nuclear submarine commander, you should never have been allowed near this document. Please dispose of it as you would any piece of high-level radioactive waste and then arrange with a qualified surgeon to amputate your arms at the elbows and gouge your eyes from their sockets. This warning is necessary because once, a hundred years ago, a little old lady in Kentucky put a hundred dollars into a dry goods company that went belly-up and returned her only ninety-nine dollars. Ever since, the government has been on our asses. If you ignore this warning, read on at your peril — you are dead certain to lose everything you’ve got and live out your final decades beating back waves of termites in a Mississippi Delta leper colony.

Still reading? Great. Now that we’ve scared off the lightweights, let’s get down to business.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: We will raise [some money], then [do some stuff] and increase shareholder value. Want details? Read on.

INTRODUCTION: [This trend], which everyone knows about, and [that trend], which is so incredibly arcane that you probably didn’t know about it until just now, and [this other trend over here] which might seem, at first blush, to be completely unrelated, when all taken together, lead us to the (proprietary, secret, heavily patented, trademarked, and NDAed) insight that we could increase shareholder value by [doing stuff]. We will need $ [a large number] and after [not too long] we will be able to realize an increase in value to $ [an even larger number], unless [hell freezes over in midsummer].

DETAILS:
Phase 1: After taking vows of celibacy and abstinence and foregoing all of our material possessions for homespun robes, we (viz. appended resumes) will move into a modest complex of scavenged refrigerator boxes in the central Gobi Desert, where real estate is so cheap that we are actually being paid to occupy it, thereby enhancing shareholder value even before we have actually done anything. On a daily ration consisting of a handful of uncooked rice and a ladleful of water, we will [begin to do stuff].

Phase 2, 3, 4, . . . , n – 1: We will [do more stuff, steadily enhancing shareholder value in the process] unless [the earth is struck by an asteroid a thousand miles in diameter, in which case certain assumptions will have to be readjusted; refer to Spreadsheets 397-413 ].

Phase n: Before the ink on our Nobel Prize certificates is dry, we will confiscate the property of our competitors, including anyone foolish enough to have invested in their pathetic companies. We will sell all of these people into slavery. All proceeds will be redistributed among our shareholders, who will hardly notice, since Spreadsheet 265 demonstrates that, by this time, the company will be larger than the British Empire at its zenith.

SPREADSHEETS: [Pages and pages of numbers in tiny print, conveniently summarized by graphs that all seem to be exponential curves screaming heavenward, albeit with enough pseudo-random noise in them to lend plausibility.]

RESUMES: Just recall the opening reel of “The Magnificent Seven”, and you won’t have to bother with this part; you should crawl to us on hands and knees, and beg us for the privilege of paying our salaries.

When gushing about the attractiveness of capital investments into Utilities, Buffett always added one small qualifier, “…as long as the regulators…..”.

The mundane aspect of it was around rate setting, permitting etc. But this tail aspect of regulation is playing out large with these lawsuits. “Keep the power on” has been the underpinning of the regulatory compact for 100 years. The lawsuits are essentially the polar opposite of. “Why didn’t you shut it down “. BHE / Pacificorp has been guillotined with the state regulators not playing their part in recognizing this fundamental compact.

Absent regulatory teaming, utility investments go from “how to stay rich” to “too hard to touch”. Akin to entering into insurance contracts in countries where the legal system is not mature enough to handle claim disputes.

I would like to hear from Greg on one nagging question unanswered in last year’s meeting. Did Pacificorp/BHE do their due diligence on the liability, back when the original contract was inked. Like in 1990’s, 80’s? That was implied by Buffett last year. Selling off the Washington state assets suggests that it may not have been. Sam Walton learned early in Walmart’s history that real estate contracts mattered. They got burned on poorly executed leases. Walton shunned all leases since.

“Better to cut your losses. And quickly.”. has been the approach Buffett has passed down to Greg, it appears to me.

Is this Washington utility divestment reflected in the current stock price? Will we end up selling other utility assets?

I would like to hear from Greg on one nagging question unanswered in last year’s meeting. Did Pacificorp/BHE do their due diligence on the liability, back when the original contract was inked.

I think Buffett said in the annual meeting that, in hindsight, they should have did each state separately to limit the contagion.

I think Buffett said in the annual meeting that, in hindsight, they should have did each state separately to limit the contagion.

Yes, Buffett said they should have structured Pacificorp such that each state utility is an independent corporate entity, sot one big blob covering multiple states which resulted in the current contagion whereby they were forced to sell "good" WA assets to pay for "bad" OR liabilities.

Seems like an unforced error on the part of Sokol, Abel & Buffet.

"What would YOU consider a successful letter?"

1. Clear messaging on where we're at with BHE and what the plan is for the future.

2. What will be his plan for the equity portfolio especially since Todd moved on. Will Ted have a bigger role? I hope he defines what Warren was eluding to about him making large capital allocations. Was he talking about large acquisitions or actually doing stock purchases as well?

3. Either not declaring a dividend or announcing a logical dividend policy. I've always felt there's a bit of a middle ground here that's never been explored. For example, you could state in the policy that a dividend could never be over a certain percentage. Warren's big hesitation was always "a promise for the future" and I am very sympathetic to his view. If we did declare a dividend, and say, it could never be over half a percent I'd be fine with it. I just don't want Berkshire to ever be a dividend monster that feels the need to perpetually increase the payout.

4. A clear message where he thinks he can make the company more efficient with out losing productivity. Warren was always fairly loose in this regard but Greg is more of an operator so I'm hoping we get some insight into how he thinks we can maybe do more with less.

5. A nice earnings report :-)

From my brokers newsletter:

DJ Berkshire's New CEO Delivers His First Shareholder Letter Soon. Wall Street Is Watching. -- Barrons.com


Andrew Bary

The inaugural shareholder letter from Berkshire Hathaway CEO Greg Abel is due on Saturday, along with Berkshire's annual report and fourth-quarter earnings. Wall Street will be on alert for Abel's insights on key issues such as dividends and stock repurchases.

Abel, 63, became CEO at year-end when Warren Buffett retired from the job after 60 years at the helm. Abel was Buffett's handpicked successor and had overseen the company's vast non-insurance operating units for nearly eight years before becoming CEO.

Buffett, 95, remains chairman, is the company's controlling shareholder and has said he plans to be at Berkshire's Omaha offices daily this year.

Buffett struck a folksy, conversational tone with his eagerly anticipated annual letters, which generally have run 10 to 15 pages. So it will be interesting to see the tone, substance, and length of Abel's missive.

Abel hasn't said much so far about what he plans to do as CEO.

CFRA analyst Cathy Seifert says Berkshire investors would like to get to know him better in addition to hearing about issues such as stock buybacks.

"How much will Greg inject his personality into the letter?" Seifert asked. "My concern is that people may be looking for too much in the letter. He's a close-to-vest, buttoned-up kind of guy. Expectations should be kept in check from what we've seen of him."

Buffett has commented that Abel plays a more active role in managing the company's dozens of operating subsidiaries than Buffett did.

Abel has spoken at Berkshire's annual meetings and given detailed answers to questions about topics such as Berkshire's utility and railroad subsidiaries. Abel likely will elaborate on topics addressed in his letter -- and much more -- at Berkshire's annual meeting in early May.

Expect Abel to pay tribute in the letter to Buffett and the extraordinary company he built over six decades. Investors, however, will be focused on the future and those comments will probably be the most consequential.

The letter could boost Berkshire's stock if Abel signals an intention to pay a dividend and if he says Berkshire plans to be a large buyer of its stock -- or if the company resumed share repurchases in the fourth quarter.

Buffett has opposed a dividend, saying cash is better in his hands than in those of Berkshire holders. Many Berkshire holders agree, not wanting to pay taxes on any payouts.

The thinking among some Berkshire watchers is a dividend will eventually be paid at Berkshire, but it may not come until after Buffett's death.

If a dividend comes sooner, perhaps as early as this year, it likely would be favorably viewed in the investment community despite the opposition from some die-hard Berkshire shareholders. It would show the company is returning more cash to holders rather than hoarding it. Berkshire could comfortably support a 2% dividend, which could help the stock by attracting new investors -- retail and institutional.

There is pressure to return more cash to Berkshire holders because its cash pile has more than doubled over the past two years. It totaled over $350 billion on Sept. 30, about a third of the company's market value of $1.1 trillion. Berkshire has far more cash than any other American company.

Buffett has been willing to sit on the cash while awaiting investment opportunities. Wall Street may be less patient with Abel if he indicates Berkshire will continue that practice.

Berkshire stock rose 10.9% in 2025, trailing the S&P 500 index by about seven percentage points. The Class A shares, at around $748,000, are up less than 1% this year and are roughly in line with the S&P 500.

Bill Stone, the chief investment officer at Glenview Trust, notes Berkshire provides on its website a detailed presentation on the company's utility and energy unit -- Berkshire Hathaway Energy (BHE) -- that Abel formerly headed.

"I'd love to see him give a similar state of the union of Berkshire Hathaway and an update on all the major business units," he told Barron's.

On capital allocation, Seifert says Berkshire should set a buyback authorization of a reasonable size even if there is no current activity. Some think Berkshire ought to consider a tender offer for its stock that could retire $50 billion or more in a single transaction. Berkshire stock now trades around 1.5 times its projected year-end 2025 book value. That's in line with the average valuation in recent years. The stock was similarly valued in 2024 when the company was buying back stock.

Buffett decided on whether to buy back stock when he was CEO. It's unclear where Abel is being given the same authority or whether Buffett and the Berkshire board of directors are involved in repurchase decisions.

Buffett has overseen Berkshire's $300 billion equity portfolio and managed about 90% of it with investment managers Ted Weschler and Todd Combs handling the other 10%. Berkshire hasn't said anything specific about how things work now.

Weschler probably is playing a key role now that Combs has left for JPMorgan Chase, but nothing has been formalized. Abel's day-to-day role with the portfolio is unclear, and whether he is actively managing it or simply overseeing it. Then there is a larger issue of Berkshire's long-term plans for the equity investments and whether Berkshire plans to de-emphasize stock picking with Buffett no longer running the portfolio and the company seeing limited new investment opportunities in the stock market.

Abel may also talk about his approach to acquisitions and whether he will focus on potential deals in his wheelhouse -- utilities and energy -- or cast a wider net.

Abel personally owns over $170 million of Berkshire stock, largely A shares purchased in 2022 and 2023. Does he plan to buy more? He likely has the wherewithal, having sold a 1% stake in BHE back to the company for $870 million in cash during 2022. Buffett has over 99% of his wealth in Berkshire stock now worth around $145 billion. Abel's exposure to Berkshire stock as a percentage of his wealth is likely much lower. Berkshire doesn't give equity compensation to any employees, meaning Abel has to buy stock in the open market if he wants to own more.

Abel may also address how long Berkshire insurance chief Ajit Jain, 74, will continue to run that critical part of the company and who are potential successors.

Abel is taking the top job at an age -- 63 -- when many CEOs are on their way out. So it will be notable if he comments on its potential tenure as CEO. He may also highlight the next generation of leaders at Berkshire. Buffett has said the usual rules of executive retirement -- leaving at 65 -- don't apply at Berkshire.

Berkshire isn't just any company. It has a huge investor base totaling about three million with many passionate holders. It also has created significant wealth for longtime investors.

There is much for Abel to tackle in the letter and he likely won't get to everything. But it should make for a fascinating read as his first major communication with Berkshire investors.

Write to Andrew Bary at andrew.bary@barrons.com

This content was created by Barron's, which is operated by Dow Jones & Co. Barron's is published independently from Dow Jones Newswires and The Wall Street Journal.


(END) Dow Jones Newswires

February 23, 2026 15:43 ET (20:43 GMT)

" If a dividend comes sooner, perhaps as early as this year, it likely would be favorably viewed in the investment community despite the opposition from some die-hard Berkshire shareholders. It would show the company is returning more cash to holders rather than hoarding it. Berkshire could comfortably support a 2% dividend, which could help the stock by attracting new investors -- retail and institutional."


To be clear I oppose a 2 % div yield. 1 % makes brkb competitive with SPYs current yield with much less risk, concentration, and little exposure to tech.



" On capital allocation, Seifert says Berkshire should set a buyback authorization of a reasonable size even if there is no current activity. Some think Berkshire ought to consider a tender offer for its stock that could retire $50 billion or more in a single transaction. Berkshire stock now trades around 1.5 times its projected year-end 2025 book value. That's in line with the average valuation in recent years. The stock was similarly valued in 2024 when the company was buying back stock."

I oppose a tender offer all that will do is goose the stock higher with little certainty brk will buyback much stock. This is a terrible idea.

My guess, Greg will say that if the company doesn't see opportunistic situations to deploy meaningful capital by year end, a quarterly dividend will be considered in q-4. IF Buffett understood why a quarterly dividend is appropriate at this time, HE would have declared a 25-cent quarterly dividend when he left the stage. He didn't, hence it's very doubtful Greg will move quickly and step on Buffett's toes.


your favorite partner, hc, who never gets it right. ::))

There is zero chance of a dividend as long as Warren controls the stock. It may come in due course once he donates the stock to the children's foundation.

" There is zero chance of a dividend as long as Warren controls the stock. It may come in due course once he donates the stock to the children's foundation."


That's 100 percent wrong or Buffett wasn't honest, Greg isn't in charge. Let's see what the plan is to deploy capital the next two years.

FWIW.

I support a dividend. 2% is fine. Too much cash is sitting idle.

I support any buybacks up to 95% of IV, which I estimate to be approximately $525 per share and growing.

I would like to see:

$20 BB+ in dividends rain or shine.

$50 BB+ per year in buybacks or new equity purchases, assuming the price is reasonable?
Very hard to do buyback without a tender.
Additionally, maybe the disruption of AI will create some equity opportunities.

“ FWIW.

I support a dividend. 2% is fine. Too much cash is sitting idle.“. Yikes, someone has joined me in the Brkville doghouse, publicly. That large a Div would be a slap in Buffett’s face in 2026, small steps in Brkville while Buffett is alive . 25 cents to 50 cents quarterly hopefully won’t cause him a stroke. A tender at 525 might buy 10-20 billion or more depending on Saturdays letter.

"Very hard to do buyback without a tender."

or an ASR -

Key Aspects of ASR Programs

Mechanism: The company pays an investment bank to buy back shares; the bank borrows these shares from the market to deliver immediately and covers its short position by purchasing shares over a following period (e.g., several months).

Speed and Volume: Unlike open-market repurchases (OMR) that may take months, ASRs deliver a large block of shares almost immediately.
Settlement: At the end, if the bank paid less than the upfront price, the firm may receive extra shares; if the price was higher, the firm may pay extra cash or shares.

Motivation: Companies often use ASRs when they believe their stock is undervalued, to reduce outstanding shares quickly, or to signal confidence in their financial health.

Pricing: The final price is usually based on a volume-weighted average price (VWAP) over the term, often with a, discount or, in some cases, a capped/collared structure.

Costs: These programs are subject to the 1% federal excise tax on net buybacks implemented in 2023

Very hard to do buyback without a tender."
A certain old timer suggested almost 20 years ago on the Fools board , that Brk should have “ the right of first refusal on all foundation sales.” As far as I know Brk still does not have that right, another huge mistake. In the past year it would have been easy for Brk to buyback 50 billion plus below 500, he had no interest. Do facts ever matter to most partners?

A certain old timer suggested almost 20 years ago on the Fools board , that Brk should have “ the right of first refusal on all foundation sales.” As far as I know Brk still does not have that right, another huge mistake.

Is it possible for Berkshire to have the right of first refusal on all sales from a foundation?
Could Mr. Buffett have made that a condition when giving the shares?
It sounds dodgy. Not something Mr. Buffett would be interested in.

In the past year it would have been easy for Brk to buyback 50 billion plus below 500, he had no interest. Do facts ever matter to most partners?

He had no interest because the share price wasn't under intrinsic value, conservatively calculated. Facts certainly don't matter to some partners, lol.

" Is it possible for Berkshire to have the right of first refusal on all sales from a foundation?
Could Mr. Buffett have made that a condition when giving the shares?
It sounds dodgy. Not something Mr. Buffett would be interested in.

In the past year it would have been easy for Brk to buyback 50 billion plus below 500, he had no interest. Do facts ever matter to most partners?

He had no interest because the share price wasn't under intrinsic value, conservatively calculated. Facts certainly don't matter to some partners, lol."


Good morning partner, as long as its DISCLOSED, yes, brk could have acquired the right of first refusal on all foundation sales and still can.

Are you reading the proposals of others here pal? Would a tender at 525 or higher be at, material discounts to IV at this time?

I'm always here to hold your hand, partner. ::))

Well, I just don't know how to state it..without stating it. My view is the most all of corporate America is living terrified of the political powerhouse. The spoken and written output from this bunch to me is something to question, honesty may not be in anyone's best interest.

Greg may be able, maybe willing, to slide out a bit more clarity as to how a more independent, maybe best described as less intimidated, person sees things. Just my slant. In any event he's not in the photo sessions with any politician - at least from what I've seen.

This may too be irrelevant, but my guess is that it isn't irrelevant at all.

" A certain old timer suggested almost 20 years ago on the Fools board , that Brk should have “ the right of first refusal on all foundation sales.” As far as I know Brk still does not have that right, another huge mistake."


Let me explain this to you since I'm that kind of partner.

brk would file an 8 K disclosing that the company had acquired the right of first refusal on all foundation sales going forward. The filing would disclose the, right, in no way implies an intention or obligation to purchase any shares being sold. The purchases would be disclosed quarterly.

IF the SEC wasn't happy with this plan they would respond by sending brk, the company a, comment letter, explaining their objections. brk would cure the objections if the SEC had any.

That's how it works in the real world, partner, been there, done that, for a decade plus, your serve pal. ::))

I'll be heading to the park soon so hurry.

Are you reading the proposals of others here pal? Would a tender at 525 or higher be at, material discounts to IV at this time?

If you estimate IV with publicly available data using the method Mr. Buffett himself laid out, a tender at $525 or higher would NOT be at a material discount to IV at this time. On Saturday we can revise our estimates, but don't get too excited. I doubt that IV went up 20% in 2025Q4...

Let me explain this to you since I'm that kind of partner.

brk would file an 8 K disclosing that the company had acquired the right of first refusal on all foundation sales going forward. The filing would disclose the, right, in no way implies an intention or obligation to purchase any shares being sold. The purchases would be disclosed quarterly.

IF the SEC wasn't happy with this plan they would respond by sending brk, the company a, comment letter, explaining their objections. brk would cure the objections if the SEC had any.

That's how it works in the real world, partner, been there, done that, for a decade plus, your serve pal. ::))

Thanks for the explanation, partner. Gemini agrees with you.

For 38 years, I’ve grown accustomed to the singular voice of Warren Buffett—a blend of clarity, candor, discipline, and humor. As we look to the first annual shareholder letter from Greg Abel in his capacity as CEO I expect a tone thats steady, straightforward, and deeply respectful of that legacy—without attempting to replicate it.

There can never be “another Warren Buffett.” That is neither realistic nor necessary. A central part of Buffett’s enduring gift to his successor and to Berkshire’s co-owners is not merely a philosophy, but a fortress: one of the premier, most heavily capitalized enterprises in the world, with historic liquidity. Berkshire today sits on Fort Knox capital—paired with a collection of operating businesses built for durability, long-term compounding, and decentralized excellence. It is a canvas like none other.

This extraordinary financial strength HAS ALWAYS provided two simultaneous advantages: resilience in uncertain times and the ability to act decisively when rare opportunities emerge. Few institutions, if any, can deploy capital at scale across public equities, private businesses, infrastructure, energy, insurance, and beyond—without strain. That optionality, preserved and enlarged over decades, is a huge strategic asset.

We should expect Abel to bring a distinct emphasis to the OPERATING side of the enterprise. Over the past seven years in particular, his focus has been deeply rooted in Berkshire’s subsidiaries—their economics, capital intensity, regulatory environments, and growth prospects. While Buffett’s letters often emphasized capital allocation and marketable securities, Abel is uniquely positioned to provide greater operational texture: how our energy businesses are investing for the long term, how our manufacturing and service companies are navigating cycles, and how disciplined reinvestment remains the foundation of intrinsic value growth. This is something I’m really looking forward to.

Another area where we may get insight is capital return. Berkshire now possesses substantial excess capital and will continue to generate significant free cash flow. It would not be surprising to see Abel articulate a general framework—rather than rigid commitments—around returning capital to shareholders. I’d be surprised if we don’t get general guidance here.

One plausible approach could involve targeting a meaningful portion of FUTURE free cash flow for shareholder returns over time—perhaps in the range of 25–50%—while preserving flexibility. A small, dependable base dividend could coexist with opportunistic share repurchases when intrinsic value meaningfully exceeds market price, along with the possibility of occasional special dividends. Importantly, any such framework would likely avoid binding promises beyond a fixed, conservative payout, ensuring that Berkshire retains the AGILITY that’s long defined our success.

In the end, Greg’s first letter may be remembered less for style and humor and more for signaling stewardship—of culture, capital, and credibility. Berkshire’s future will not be built on imitation, but on continuity of principles with Greg’s fresh perspective. The legacy is secure. The canvas is vast. The responsibility—and the opportunity—now passes forward. Our best days are ahead.

I feel like this is a little bit too much whistling past the graveyard. Saying our best days are ahead of us post Buffett seems a little ridiculous.

I am also a longterm stockholder, but I'm not nearly as confident as you that things are going to be so rosy.

"I am also a longterm stockholder, but I'm not nearly as confident as you that things are going to be so rosy."

Well it's all about perspective. For a lot of us on here it's about wealth preservation coupled with reliable, albeit, steady returns. We can sleep well at night on our pillow of $360B :-). I just read Andrew Sorkin's "1929" and I can't recommend it highly enough! Wonderful insight into the characters of that time and certain parallels to today. My new mantra is "Would I never have to work again if there was a 50% drop in the market?" because gosh darnit, it's likely to happen! I guess this is my take on Warren's "would a company survive if it's run by a moron, because one day it will" :-)

<<I'm not nearly as confident as you that things are going to be so rosy.>>

I think things are pretty rosy RIGHT NOW. What’s not to like about the cash earnings, the balance sheet, and the liquidity?

I think there’s a lot of low hanging fruit with operational efficiencies that will flow directly to the bottom line…and we are principally a collection of operating companies…and Greg is an operations guy. I don’t see how thats not an improvement at this stage in Berkshire’s evolution.

My new mantra is "Would I never have to work again if there was a 50% drop in the market?" because gosh darnit, it's likely to happen!

I'm sure most of us here had substantial portions of our net worth drop 50% in 2008/2009. It wasn't obvious at the time that it would come back so quick, not to me anyhow. I've had the same mantra ever since. So, I worked longer than I had to, but, meh, no hardship since I liked doing it.

I have tried to convey to millennials, set on retiring at 40 on a 4 or 5% withdrawal rate, just how it feels to have your net worth drop by over 50% in a few months. I guess it's just something you have to experience (cue the Fred Schwed quote, but I won't repeat it).

I think there’s a lot of low hanging fruit with operational efficiencies that will flow directly to the bottom line…and we are principally a collection of operating companies…and Greg is an operations guy. I don’t see how thats not an improvement at this stage in Berkshire’s evolution.

I agree we might gain some efficiencies due to Greg's operational skill, but I don't think that balances out what we lose on the capital allocation front.

I think Berkshire will eventually have to succumb to an Apple-like auto buyback strategy or regular dividend.
I am afraid Greg will constantly have tremendous pressure put on him to "do something" with all that cash, and I would rather have a more aggressive buyback strategy or even a stupid regular dividend in place verses having Greg constantly pressured into making a very large (and possibly disastrous) acquisition.

"I agree we might gain some efficiencies due to Greg's operational skill, but I don't think that balances out what we lose on the capital allocation front."

This


Plus Greg has had several years with the mantle of having the operating companies reporting to him.

"I think things are pretty rosy RIGHT NOW. "

I don't think BHE is rosy. Nor is BNSF. But no argument that we have a ton of capital to deploy.

I think BHE is mostly rosy if you go through BHE asset by asset. Pacificorp is contained and Buffett has mentioned that they will not fund losses infinitum.

NV Energy (although Nevada is more amenable regulator) is mostly fine, possibly Altalink as a Canadian Rockies transmission grid has some wildfire risk.

MidAmerican Energy does have some issues with regulators in Illinois but mostly good.

Northern Grid is fine.

Northern Gas and Kern River and BHE GTS are fine (NG transport pipeline).

BHE Transmission is fine (smaller wildfire risk).

Home Services of America isn't great but the whole RE brokerage business is disruption.

Left off BHE Renewables which is a merchant power company that owns and operates solar, wind, NG, geothermal, hydro power plants. Sort of a grab bag of power projects but includes venture type investments in lithium extraction (JV with OXY) and solar/battery power plant for PCP in West Virginia.

I am afraid Greg will constantly have tremendous pressure put on him to "do something" with all that cash, and I would rather have a more aggressive buyback strategy or even a stupid regular dividend in place verses having Greg constantly pressured into making a very large (and possibly disastrous) acquisition.

Do you really think the hand-picked CEO of a trillion dollar company will be pressured into buying something just to buy something?

Abel is patiently waiting. Just like Buffett was patiently waiting. And the longer you wait the higher likelihood something bad will happen, which will be good for Berkshire.

All this angst about Abel bowing to Wall Street to prove himself is pretty comical. They've never bowed to Wall Street.

I think there's a number of activities, actions, or adjustments that Greg, Ajit, Ted, or others might have been holding on their "to do" list, that weren't burning imperatives but that they know they would be able to do more quickly and adeptly after the leadership change. I'm excited, as a student of business, in seeing what these might be.

Also, I attempted to type in the URL (assuming the 2025 AR will be posted using the same notation as 2023 and 2024) to see if it is posted already but not linked to their reports page, but alas. No trickery for this old spy...

I think there's a number of activities, actions, or adjustments that Greg, Ajit, Ted, or others might have been holding on their "to do" list, that weren't burning imperatives but that they know they would be able to do more quickly and adeptly after the leadership change.

The two recent wildfire claim closures are not inconsistent with that theory...

Jim

Abel is patiently waiting. Just like Buffett was patiently waiting. And the longer you wait the higher likelihood something bad will happen, which will be good for Berkshire.

All this angst about Abel bowing to Wall Street to prove himself is pretty comical. They've never bowed to Wall Street.


You think Abel is immune to pressure? I seriously doubt that. CM and WB were, but those dudes were built different.

I hope I'm wrong!

As for me, I am wishing that Greg has found his “Carol Loomis”, to help him refine and communicate his message. Whether he is feeding us ice cream or brussel sprouts, he should (must!) be clear and decisive. And readable, especially for the elderly aunts.

Solid, but uninspired.

The first reading leaves me...underwhelmed.

Things that stood out to me

Emphasis on shareholders

Calling out Shaw for self inflicted wounds

Not resting until Pilot is #1

PCP doing well

Call out to Ted, he’s staying

Having other managers at the table at the annual meeting

No quarterly communications meaning no conference calls, glad this still the same

Calling out mistakes

Very similar views and observations that parallel your great bullet list.

I also like that he called out a good number of data point such as "Berkshire delivered operating earnings of $44.5 billion in 2025, below $47.4 billion in 2024 and above the $37.5 billion we have averaged over the past five years" - there were a number of five year recent average sort of data points. A few more:



"In 2025, Berkshire produced $46 billion of net cash flows from operating activities, compared to a five-year average of more than $40 billion"

"We produced a combined ratio of 87.1% across our property and casualty businesses in 2025, comparing favorably with our five-year average of 90.7%, ten-year average of 93.0% and twenty-year average of 92.2%"

"In 2025, BNSF produced $8.1 billion in net operating cash flows and. returned $4.4 billion of that cash to Berkshire through dividends. For context, its average annual dividend over the past five years was $4.1 billion."

"In 2025, BNSF’s operating margin improved to 34.5% from 32.0% in 2024. It remained only modestly above its five-year average."



What seemed absent? No mention of Todd Combs, but in passing (Ted taking over his investing portfolio) - no sort of "we thank Todd for his service, both in investing decisions and turning around Geico, and hope we'll be able to do business in the future".
Sure, Warren's gone. But...we're measuring the new guy (who has effectively been there since 1992, but will always be new guy) against the legend, which is not fair. Greg is going to fix some things that Warren cannot, or would not, fix. He pointed out plenty of warts - Pilot, Heinz, Shaw come to mind. He was candid; we often see Warren simply no longer mention things that are distasteful. You all probably read The Snowball - Alice Schroeder recounted *many* times he was sort of passive or quiet.

Reaffirming the culture was the right move. A decent page-ish tribute to Warren which seemed the correct length - and mentioning he was still in the office 5 days a week. I'm looking forward to what is next, and am not going to grouse about the tone or composition of this letter. Greg gave more data and numbers than Warren has in the past few years, like the excerpts I listed above.

I too am neither a buyer nor seller.

Great point on Todd not being mentioned or thanked.

Greg comes across as no nonsense. “We will not make that mistake again” regarding not having full control of operations on Pilot from beginning.

Calling the meeting an ‘investor day’ sort of. Looks like a full hour of business update before Q&A, maybe we get more granularity.

no sort of "we thank Todd for his service, both in investing decisions and turning around Geico, and hope we'll be able to do business in the future".
Great point on Todd not being mentioned or thanked.

Todd's departure was nicely publicly acknowledged by Warren in the December press release. It's okay if Greg didn't do it again in the annual letter. Below implies he left in good standing and by extension doing business in the future is an option.

As part of this transition, Todd A. Combs will conclude his tenure at Berkshire Hathaway and join JPMorgan Chase & Co., where he has served as a Director of its Board since 2016. Warren E. Buffett, Berkshire’s Chairman, added: “Todd A. Combs, CEO of GEICO since 2020, has resigned to accept an interesting and important job at JPMorgan, which they describe in a press release that will be available very soon on their website. Todd made many great hires at GEICO and broadened its horizons. JPMorgan, as usually is the case, has made a good decision.”

https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/dec0825.pdf

In 2025, Berkshire produced $46 billion of net cash flows from operating activities, compared to a five-year average of more than $40 billion

In 2025, BNSF ...returned $4.4 billion of that cash to Berkshire through dividends. For context, its average annual dividend over the past five years was $4.1 billion.

Reading those sentences carefully, it seems 2025 is being compared with the five-year period 2021-2025, inclusive.

Perplexity: "By standard index-level measures, S&P 500 revenues had more than recovered from the pandemic shock by 2021 and were growing solidly by 2022"

Perplexity again: average CPI 2021-2025 was 4.9%/year bc this period includes the pandemic bump.

So presenting a nominal ten-ish percent increase in any revenue metric over a five year average as a positive finding seems...maybe not milking the data, but not entirely disingenuous, either.

In a rolling five-year period, isn't our IV supposed to increase after inflation?

--sutton

Solid, but uninspired.

The first reading leaves me...underwhelmed.

I had the opposite reaction. Reading about the staggeringly large scope of his responsibilities in his new role, I felt overwhelmed. How can one brain handle so much?

On the operations side, if you think about how many employees, companies, geographies, types of businesses, revenue, capital allocation and acquisition decisions, etc., he is responsible for, the numbers are ridiculously large. Equally mind numbing are the hundreds of billions he is responsible for in the equity investment portfolio. And Greg, while you are doing all this, don't forget to control risk and keep the culture!

Imagine being in his shoes. How pumped up and inspired he must be! Yes, he has been in leadership roles for a long time, but that's not the same as being crowned king!

If he can handle so much, I am certainly feeling inspired that I can do better in my humble life where everything is miniscule in comparison.

I hope this goes the "Jobs-Cook", "Ballmer-Nadella" way and Greg Abel takes Berkshire to greater heights in the years to come. I liked how he closed with "We move forward with great intent and purpose". It's a good thought to have. We all need great intent and purpose in our lives, even though our goals may be a lot less lofty.

Homework assignment. Test all links on below page and confirm they all work.
https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/subs/sublinks.ht...

"In 2025, Berkshire produced $46 billion of net cash flows from operating activities, compared to a five-year average of more than $40 billion"

What a curious way to put it. The five-year average could be $41 billion, and the 2025 results would have bested it, or the five-year average could be $92 billion, and the 2024 results would have indicated something drastically failed. And either way the sentence would be technically correct.

Solid, but uninspired.
The first reading leaves me...underwhelmed.

I have to admit that was my first reaction too. Now, with the benefit of, oh 24 hours reflection, I would have to up my reaction to “whelmed”, at the very least.

I think I (understandably) suffered from expectation anxiety. It’s like the first post-Beatles album that came out after the band broke up. How could anything ever be as good, much less better? (Tip: it can’t.)

But upon reflection is see that all the important notes in the symphony were struck: culture, thanks, admission of failures where appropriate, continuance, and so on. There’s probably nothing that could have led to me think other than “a nice corporate report full of corporation corporateness”, but it was more than that.

It was “reassuring”, if not stellar. There are times when that is enough.

“all the important notes in the symphony were struck: culture, thanks, admission of failures where appropriate, continuance, and so on.”

Agree, these were my initial comments to my bro & mom who are owners, but not overly interested as we all are.😁

“Just read- Greg Abel’s 18 page letter was very good imo- checked a lot of boxes. I’d give it a A minus. Wish it had a bit more humor but it’s his first letter. Great focus on owners as partners, honesty, integrity, decentralization, respect for WEB, continuing to do what has worked and maintaining culture & values and patient & disciplined approach to allocation.”

Reading those sentences carefully, it seems 2025 is being compared with the five-year period 2021-2025, inclusive.
Perplexity: "By standard index-level measures, S&P 500 revenues had more than recovered from the pandemic shock by 2021 and were growing solidly by 2022"
Perplexity again: average CPI 2021-2025 was 4.9%/year bc this period includes the pandemic bump.
So presenting a nominal ten-ish percent increase in any revenue metric over a five year average as a positive finding seems...maybe not milking the data, but not entirely disingenuous, either.
In a rolling five-year period, isn't our IV supposed to increase after inflation?


That's a bit inappropriately harsh.

First, I think his comments were intended primarily along the line of "it was a reasonably good year, numbers were better than the recent average". Value is growing, though obviously not soaring.

But taken as data points for a rate of growth, note that he compared the most recent year to the five year average, NOT the level five years ago. The middle of a five year average is only two years before the middle of the most recent year. So, for example, the recent $46bn of net cash flows from operating earnings versus a five year average of $40bn would (to the extent it's meaningful) represent a compound annual growth rate of 7.24%/year, since you need to annualized for two years, not five.

Though it's rather an odd calculation to choose, US CPI inflation calculated the same way would be 3.58%, so you could (if squinting) think of the recent growth rate of net cash flow from operations as inflation + 3.66%/year. A slow patch, but not backsliding. US monetary inflation has actually been remarkably steady around 2.8% for the last 2.5 years, using MCT inflation figures. Think of that as "what is the change in the purchasing power of a buck, ignoring product category specific anomalous price changes". If the price of eggs soars but everything else is flat, that's an egg problem, not a problem with the value of a dollar.

Jim

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