Post New

One problem with the deterministic arrow of big-banging time is its abnegation of free will. In order for free will to have any meaning whatsoever it must influence present experience — aka causation. Clearly the notion of free will is a near-unanimously accepted human construct. In this respect the common view is anthropic, as might well be expected.

The whole business is ever complexifying relations among ubiquitously emergent experience of boundless events perceived as existence.

This leads me to believe that evolving existence must include feedback between emergent experience and infinite potential. That would be necessary for protons, and the complexities composed of them, to persist for billions of years. What's most fascinating to me is that their component quarks flicker in no time, a likely prerequisite to negotiating infinite possibilities on behalf of still-minuscule client protons and neutrons.

One might propose that existence is a collaborative process in which every eventuality influences whatever happens next.

In other words, our choices and resultant actions must influence outcomes in order for our lives to bear any meaning. Almost no one disputes that, as everyday experience convincingly confirms it. You can bend your finger as you will. Without such free agency, life and being would bear no meaning, and any sense of responsibility would be fantasy.

Yet the determinism of one-way big-banging evolution — contemporary universality emergent within original singularity — fails to account for this seemingly manifest intentional causation.

Any notion of causality projects an arrow of time — causal events happening before caused outcomes. The anthropic issue is whether cognition, or intent, can alter the present flow from recollected past to anticipated future, prompting the question: Does existence include feedback?

I'd suggest that the universe of collective experience, however it may be defined, reflects organically evolving perception, comprised of sensation, recollection, cognition, anticipation, expression, remembrance. All-encompassing experiential remembrance at the service of situationally induced recollection serve as the polarities of the human feedback loop.

This complex entanglement guarantees vulnerability to anthropic bias with respect to anything thought, spoken, written, or read from a human perspective. After all is said and done, human experience of universally evolving events is what we have to work with. Dismissing human experience leaves no possibility of understanding, much less credible theorizing.

One might propose that existence is a collaborative process in which every eventuality influences whatever happens next.

That would more properly be stated as: One might propose that existence is a collaborative process in which every eventuality influences whatever's happening now.

At least that's how I see it, as I regard ongoing experience as encompassing both present remembrance and present recollection. Simultaneously recollected and remembered experience is timeless.

I believe experience includes whatever I may know about organic evolution from nothing to slime to brain-endowed human organism, all emergent through the agency of boundless quarks ubiquitously entangling finite existence within infinite potential.

Tom

It's a shame benjd25 isn't here. He'd dive head-long into this. Last I heard from him, he was having a sort of crisis about this. He spent a lot of time thinking about it, and discussing it, and realized that free will (at least libertarian free will) didn't make sense. As I recall, he labeled himself a compatibilist, and even that was being shaken.

Briefly, my view is that we have the illusion of free will. Just because we can't foresee events very well, doesn't mean they aren't already set in motion. Our reactions are dictated by genetics and "stuff that happens to us" (sthtu). Neither of which we can control. And any quantum phenomena that have any influence in anything are actually random (it's all statistics...it can be shown that they only truly random things are quantum, and "random" is not choice). Combine that with all the natural processes going on in the universe, and the genetics and sthtu of all the other beings we encounter, and it seems like we all have choice because it's too complex a system for any of us to map out. But it is still deterministic (except for quantum, which is random).

Too bad TMF scrapped all those boards. We had some seriously meaty discussions there.

Thanks for sharing your thoughts.

Our reactions are dictated by genetics and "stuff that happens to us" (sthtu). Neither of which we can control.

I don't see how the decision to tap a finger on the desk right now is dictated by genetics. And sthtu seems about as vague a notion as can be imagined.

it can be shown that they only truly random things are quantum, and "random" is not choice

Simple continuity, as in the persistence of matter, would seem to demand an influence upon otherwise random quantum processes.

it seems like we all have choice because it's too complex a system for any of us to map out.

I don't doubt that boundless complexification is beyond comprehension. But I'm also convinced that infinite possibilities necessarily include individual initiatives.

Just some thoughts.

Tom

There was a study a few years ago regarding decisions. Turns out the brain made the decision before the conscious mind was aware of it. The mind appeared to rationalize a completely automatic "decision" after the fact.

The sthtu affects the wiring of your brain, and therefore how it processes. Different experiences result in different connections being made within the brain, and that happens pretty much all of our lives. Not really vague at all.

There was a study a few years ago regarding decisions. Turns out the brain made the decision before the conscious mind was aware of it. The mind appeared to rationalize a completely automatic "decision" after the fact.

I recall that study. It prompted me to reconsider the role of consciousness within human experience, leading to a conclusion that consciousness is a reflection of outcome. Again considering simple finger manipulation, decision may precede consciousness of perceived outcome. Declaring any such "decision" as autonomic strikes me as arbitrarily based on subsequent consciousness of resultant experience.

I do not regard consciousness as equivalent to experience. Human experience, in my view includes simultaneous — ie atemporal — sensation, recollection, cognition, anticipation and remembrance of the whole, including the repository available to present recollection. Consciousness is an after-the-fact summation of that experience.

The sthtu affects the wiring of your brain, and therefore how it processes. Different experiences result in different connections being made within the brain, and that happens pretty much all of our lives.

No doubt about it, sthtu (shḬt happening) definitely influences individual evolution. But it doesn't alter the dynamically reflective aspect of experience.

Tom

There was a study a few years ago regarding decisions. Turns out the brain made the decision before the conscious mind was aware of it. The mind appeared to rationalize a completely automatic "decision" after the fact.

So what? It is still your brain making the decision, not some cosmic collision of particles forcing it. I can decide anything I choose to decide. Otherwise there is no point in ever deciding anything, since it’s all pre-ordained. Is that really the world you want to believe in?

There was a study a few years ago regarding decisions. Turns out the brain made the decision before the conscious mind was aware of it. The mind appeared to rationalize a completely automatic "decision" after the fact.

The Libet experiments with decisions made before we are consciously aware of them, explains nothing whatsoever about freedom of will. Yet it is a very interesting subject.

This subject of being less in control of our decision goes further also. Some other studies reveal that our decision making is not only more automatic than we think, but far worse - we often unconsciously retrospectively revise our own memory of past events, to make them more coherent, or meaningful, as viewed in the present. So not only are we not in control of our decisions (our conscious reflection can be a rationalistion rather than the decision process itself) but what we we thought we believed often isn't what we, in the past, actually even believed.

The following experiment elegantly demonstrates how we revise our memory. Imagine a number of subjects sleeping, each in the REM state of the sleep which is when dreaming is taking place, and then imagine that you suddenly wake each the subjects up with sudden loud crashing sound (without any interruption at all prior to the sudden sound). As they were dreaming, they can explain how the explosive sound interrupted their dream. You would expect them to explain the dream, at least for the few that can remember the dream, such that the crashing sound occurred suddenly and interrupted what they were dreaming about. What proceeded the crashing sound should generally have no relation to the sound itself. It turns out that a remarkable thing occurs - the subjects instead describe their dream as gradually leading up the crashing sound with a causal relation, and interconnected meaning. For example, one subject described driving a car home with friends after seeing a movie, and an attractive woman took the driver's attention, causing the driver to veer in the wrong direction slightly for quite a while, then shout and then move suddenly to the left, and then right, their swerving becoming more extreme, then the car moving into a spin, and a few seconds later, hitting a traffic light post with a crash. The dreams were recalled completely sincerely. Obviously the lead upto the crash was not possible (or if coincidentally timed, would be exceedingly rare), but rather, the subjects were frequently unconsciously backfilling their memory with a narrative that was consistent with experience. Importantly, they did not say that the dream was revised to fit the sound, but rather than this was the way in which they "remembered" their dream.

This subject above is fascinating, as we also recall past events (not dreams, but distant memory) in such a way to be more consistent with our present experience. I conducted a related experiment myself, interviewing 3 friends about how they were interpreting the news as it happened, and then repeated the questions 10 years later. It was not a deliberate experiment at first, but they happen to have written their original response, so I asked them how they recall interpreting the news 10 years ago, and they answered sincerely, but the response was different to their original response. How they remembered their past beliefs was different to the past beliefs themselves. In particular - each response was revised, unconsciously, to be more consistent with new information, ignoring the parts of their interpretation that turned out be incorrect. Similarly as the dream experiment, the news reading experiment supported that we have the capacity to unconsciously revise our memory (not only of dreams) of past experiences to have a more consistent support of the present narrative. There are a number of implications, but one of them is that we a excessively confident about the likelihood that our present views about anything are correct. Even when we are wrong about the future, we'll fool ourselves into thinking that we always knew it.

However this does not relate to the thread topic of free will. Some of confusion likely rests in our inability to comprehend (intuitively) the sheer complexity involved in our decision making. There is a lot of literature on why we don't have free will, and it is interesting to read. However the main epistemology to keep in your mind is that because we don't have an explanation for some phenomenon, it doesn't mean that the pheneomenon doesn't exist. For example, we knew for a long time that dogs can be bred with small changes, but we had no concept of DNA. We were certain that they could be bred to change by simply observation, even when we could not explain the underlying mechanics at the time. But we didn't say "This breeding cannot be taking place" - instead we conclude "The breeding seems to work, but we don't know why, for now". Or, for example, we know that we are able to produce thought, from simply observation of oberving the our speech. However we cannot yet explain the process of producing thoughts, but that doesn't lead us to conclude "Thought's can't be formed by us, maybe someone is forming the for us". We, rather, conclude "Thoughts obviously formed by ourselves, but we don't understand the process, for now". In the same manner we observe that are have moral accountability and can influence each other, make decisions based on our understanding of ourselves, our objectives, our will, and our temporary state of mind - even though are still in an extremely early stage of understanding them the process of forming thoughts.

(Actually, those that aruge against free will actually believe in free will, if they introspect; otherwise, knowing they couldn't change the opinon of the person they were talking to, they wouldn't bother to present an argument against it. If a philosopher believed everyone's behaviour was pre-determined strictly, thus all outcomes in their life unrelated to any extra energy used to influence them, they would immediately not bother to make an argument towards that person as they would believe that their outcome was determined, so no point in wasting energy.. So by trying to argue to a receipient that there is no free will, they are admitting in the process that the receipient has free will.)

- Manlobbi

It doesn't matter what I want to believe in. By every logical argument that benjd25 and I had, it was inescapable. Which Ben eventually couldn't resolve, either. The brain makes the "decision" based on genetics and sthtu. It is genetics and wiring. There appears to be nothing else, especially since I know you don't believe in a "soul" (though Ben also schooled someone that this doesn't solve the problem either).

Great! I love it.

Having been in my previous life an Author (no, I don't mean it in a religious or not resurrection way) I admire your skills to communicate in a clear and extremely understandable way. Yes, music is communication too, maybe you should also write (books)?


One comment re
.... so by trying to argue to a receipient that there is no free will, they are admitting in the process that the receipient has free will.

Your argument is based on the assumption the philosopher's actions are based on rational conscious behavior.

But as you are pointing out yourself that there are subconscious processes one has not even knowledge and therefore even less free (conscious) will about, your argument ignores that exactly those non-conscious processes might force the philosopher to behave non-rational, in this case to try to convince the other one no matter how much the philosopher is convinced himself that it's futile.

This for example is what happens every day in discussions between Atheists and non-Atheists, Demokrats and Republicans etc. One side argues to the other, knowing perfectly well it's futile - at least if the motivation really would be to convince the other one. So it's not rational.

And therefore the cause must be other, irrational motivations underneath. For example by repeating aloud the arguments why God does not exist (or the other way around), why Trump is bad (or good) one might strengthen one's own wavering believe in that. Or one might proof to the others of the social group (of Atheists etc.) that one belongs to them. Etc. There are numerous subconscious motivations for behaving in ways that rationally make no sense, and because all of that happens subconscious you have no knowledge and no choice - which points to "Free will is an illusion".

Or...they're trying to find a logical, coherent argument that can refute their position.

I haven't seen one for free will. Not yet, anyway. They invariably involve logical fallacies, or things that don't really solve the problem (e.g. soul). I will say we have the illusion of free will simply because we can't know all the genetics and wiring (especially the wiring), plus all events that influenced a given situation, plus any random quantum processes that might be at work (if any). It's far too complex, so we are "surprised" and think we are deciding things real-time. But the brain is just rationalizing a "decision" after the fact, or possibly even rewriting the narrative.

There are numerous subconscious motivations for behaving in ways that rationally make no sense, and because all of that happens subconscious you have no knowledge and no choice - which points to "Free will is an illusion".

Consciousness is not the final arbiter of free will. Consciousness is indeed more reflective than causal. An orientation or worldview that's been consciously formulated over a lifetime of careful contemplation is bound to be largely subconscious in the context of ongoing experience, which quite naturally is preoccupied with whatever's presently perceived. Yet the response to such exigencies is conditioned by the lifelong formulation of an underlying orientation. That's the basis of the notion of responsibility, and why we apply radically different expectations for the behavior of youngsters versus adults.

Tom

I don't think it's lifelong formulation of an underlying orientation. If we behaved as if there were no free choice, we probably would have been selected against (evolutionarily) and not be here to discuss this at all. Also, your example of youngster vs adults...that's wiring. Adults have experienced a lot more in life, good and bad, and the wiring of the brain has changed accordingly. This rewiring is a lifelong process, occurring constantly. It would be unusual for young people to be wired the same as us older people.

If we behaved as if there were no free choice, we probably would have been selected against (evolutionarily) and not be here to discuss this at all.

How is this not self-contradictory?

Tom

Evolutionary selection is mostly deterministic. Though, not being a biologist, I'm not sure how random the gene mutations are. I know quantum can be truly random. Also, I had no say in the evolution that resulted in me, nor the default wiring I was born with.

The knowledge that there is no free choice/will would make some people apathetic. They would not endure (because "what's the point"). Evolution, through eons of selection, has given pretty much all vertebrate life a drive to survive. So even though I don't see how one can logically point to free will, that's still in me. So I (used to) go to work, save money, eat, etc. Without the hard-wired drive to survive, our species would have ended very quickly. I'm not so morose that I dwell on it. I may have no free will, but I can't really detect that. It seems I am making choices, and every day is a new day (some filled with unanticipated surprises), and I go through them without a thought about free will. For me the subject is purely academic. It's an interesting exercise, and occasionally someone has a new angle on it.

Everything I sense, think, recollect, expect, say and do is remembered, including alterations of prior remembrance, as Manlobbi has so eloquently explained. Dynamic remembrance and situational recollection are both autonomic; remembrance much as Manlobbi has suggested, recollection as perhaps the most obvious example of environmentally induced decoherence.

Without the hard-wired drive to survive, our species would have ended very quickly.

Agreed that present existence is conditioned by evolution. I'd add that evolution includes every aspect of present experience, including dynamic remembrance and situational recollection, both subliminal. And we now know that the genetic code is subject to alteration by lifelong epigenetic evolution.

I may have no free will, but I can't really detect that. It seems I am making choices ...

As best I can tell, we're all alike in that.

... every day is a new day (some filled with unanticipated surprises), and I go through them without a thought about free will. For me the subject is purely academic. It's an interesting exercise, and occasionally someone has a new angle on it.

The notion of free will has garnered attention for millennia. I doubt many lose sleep over it, as it's self-evident to most, and to those who deny it it's obviously a waste of time — no problem as long as it seems I am making choices.

It does seem self-evident. But no one has yet presented a mechanism/argument that can account for breaking causality. All the myriad of natural events since Event One, plus all our respective wiring resulting from genetics and sthtu, has led us to this moment. What could have changed any of that? Positing a soul only transfers to the problem to something we have no evidence for, because then "how can the soul break causality" is the follow up.

But no one has yet presented a mechanism/argument that can account for breaking causality.

I've been trying to communicate an alternative perspective, apparently unsuccessfully so far.

All the myriad of natural events since Event One, plus all our respective wiring resulting from genetics and sthtu, has led us to this moment. What could have changed any of that?

In my view, human experience is more than just rote expression arising from autonomic processes of remembrance and recollection. Beyond sensation of external stimuli, it also includes cognition, anticipation and behavior, all of which are reflected in the evolving content of remembrance and recollection (reference Manlobbi's explication).

Positing a soul only transfers to the problem to something we have no evidence for, because then "how can the soul break causality" is the follow up.

I'm certainly not positing a soul, whatever that may mean. By the way, I was raised as a Catholic, and even attended a high-school seminary followed by a novitiate where saving one's soul was the agenda. I obtained a degree in philosophy from Jesuit-run but largely secular Marquette University. By a few years later I'd dropped my identification with religion, and eventually came to see it, in all its forms, as divisive and counterproductive other than as a venue for socializing. My personal story is obviously anecdotal, but if it argues for anything, it's certainly something other than strict determinism.

I believe the overwhelming tendency to regard ourselves as making choices that influence outcomes — an impression you seem to confirm — is far more credible than its denial.

Tom

I believe the overwhelming tendency to regard ourselves as making choices that influence outcomes — an impression you seem to confirm — is far more credible than its denial.

I agree that we regard ourselves as doing that. But that doesn't mean we actually are doing that. Again, I've seen no logically consistent argument, or any data, that indicates this is correct. On the contrary, our minds rationalize "decisions" our brains made after the fact, and rewrite dreams and memories (as Manlobbi described) to fit a narrative.

You may regard yourself as floating in a box when in fact you are plummeting towards a massive body (one of Einstein's thought experiments). You can't tell the difference without seeing it from another angle** (until the sudden stop at the end, of course). How you "regard" it is not really relevant.






**In physics and relativity, we say "reference frame".

Hey 1poorguy, thanks for the email alerting me to this place and this thread! And I see Goofyhoofy here!

unquarked: "Clearly the notion of free will is a near-unanimously accepted human construct."

The devil is in the details. What do you mean by 'free will'?


1poorguy: "Last I heard from him, he was having a sort of crisis about this."

The crisis was that other people didn't see compatibilist choices as real choices. I hate the idea of communicating poorly and the idea that I see things so differently from most people that we can't communicate. I didn't have any crisis with the naturalist / compatibilist conceptions of choice.

Goofyhoofy: "So what? It is still your brain making the decision, not some cosmic collision of particles forcing it."

My brain making the decision is sufficient for me. I acknowledge, though, that the state of my brain is fully determined by 'cosmic collisions of particles forcing it.'

My own short summary of the issue:

Free will is often defined in such a way that it is a four sided triangle. The definition itself is inherently contradictory, and cannot possibly exist. It requires a person's choice to be determined by a subset of reality (a person, willing the choice) while simultaneously being undetermined by the whole of reality (free to possibly have been a different choice.) This is incoherent. I certainly don't have any experience of making such a choice nor do I pretend I can make such a choice.

For me, choices that meet some minimum level of consideration and without coercion from another can be considered to be taken out of one's own free will - even though the agent making the choice couldn't have chosen otherwise in exactly identical circumstances.

When IBM's Watson was playing Jeopardy, was it exhibiting free will when it chose its answers?

Hmmm...

First, good to see you! You could always be counted on for heavy philosophy, and informing as heathens when the religionists were up to mischief.

Second, I seem to recall that a friend in your real life had said something that was making you question whether your compatibilism was valid. Obviously, that post is long gone now.

You also make a good point that we need to define "free will". The libertarian version is completely unworkable, as you say (though you didn't attach that name to it in your post). I assume that is what you meant by "four sided triangle".

...even though the agent making the choice couldn't have chosen otherwise in exactly identical circumstances.

I had assumed your friend had scored a hit on this point. For me, what you describe is not free will because "[the agent] couldn't have chosen otherwise in exactly identical circumstances". Nothing free about that, IMHO. Though you appear to be saying I am remembering that conversation incorrectly since you indicate that you weren't questioning your position.

"Second, I seem to recall that a friend in your real life had said something that was making you question whether your compatibilism was valid."

Semantically valid, yes. Can a compatibilist say they made a choice or is the concept of choice so wedded to libertarian free will that the compatibilist's statement is a lie?


"The libertarian version is completely unworkable, as you say (though you didn't attach that name to it in your post). I assume that is what you meant by "four sided triangle"."

Correct.


"I had assumed your friend had scored a hit on this point. For me, what you describe is not free will because "[the agent] couldn't have chosen otherwise in exactly identical circumstances". Nothing free about that, IMHO. Though you appear to be saying I am remembering that conversation incorrectly since you indicate that you weren't questioning your position.

I'm not and wasn't questioning what happens when human beings make choices. I was questioning whether or not the general understanding of 'choice' or 'free will' includes the compatibilist conceptions. For 'free will', I think I can make a pretty good case because of the legal understanding of it. Legally a person can be deprived of their free will by coercion. But libertarian free will is unaffected by coercion - you have just as much libertarian free will with a gun pointed at your head as you do without it.

For 'free will', I think I can make a pretty good case because of the legal understanding of it.

I'm not sure I buy that. Legally, we assume free will when determining punishment for a crime committed. But does that mean we actually have a choice outside our wiring and sthtu?

I think I said before, I think of it as more of a surprise. Everything beyond the quantum that is going to happen is going to happen. But all the interactions are so complex, that we can't know for sure in most cases what that outcome will be. So we have the illusion of choice, and we go merrily into whatever the causal history dictates to be the future. I'm OK with that (i.e. it doesn't make me say "what is the point"). I'm deriving pleasure from it while it lasts.

"I'm not sure I buy that. Legally, we assume free will when determining punishment for a crime committed. But does that mean we actually have a choice outside our wiring and sthtu?"

Is there a difference between a will produced on your own with a lawyer, according to your own wishes, and a will written while someone with a gun pointed at your kids demanding that you will everything to the gunman? You have equal amounts of philosophical free will in both cases.

I think so. We are wired for survival (most of us, anyway). That generally is priority one. So a threat to that will affect what we do. Unless you're already suicidal, in which case it wouldn't make a difference. Which is wiring and sthtu (i.e. whether you're suicidal or not).

"I think so. We are wired for survival (most of us, anyway). That generally is priority one. So a threat to that will affect what we do. Unless you're already suicidal, in which case it wouldn't make a difference. Which is wiring and sthtu (i.e. whether you're suicidal or not)."

Now you're agreeing with me. In both cases, the choice (who to will your stuff to) is determined (by wiring and sthtu) and couldn't have gone otherwise. Yet that commonality doesn't matter - in the case where the choice is being made under duress, that choice won't be legally respected as being made freely enough.

https://www.lawinsider.com/clause/free-will
https://www.notarypublicstamps.com/articles/what-i....

Not exactly, I don't think. I do agree with you that the "agent" could not do otherwise. I also agree that signing legal documents under duress can result in a voiding of those documents.

But if the agent could not do otherwise, then how is that free? As opposed to my view that the future is predetermined, but too complex to predict with any reliability, so it's a surprise.

Is there a difference between a will produced on your own with a lawyer, according to your own wishes, and a will written while someone with a gun pointed at your kids demanding that you will everything to the gunman? You have equal amounts of philosophical free will in both cases.

Whether illegal or prescription, therapeutic or recreational, how do mind-altering substances fit into your 'free will' theory?

"But if the agent could not do otherwise, then how is that free? As opposed to my view that the future is predetermined, but too complex to predict with any reliability, so it's a surprise."

What IS free, then? Nothing, right? Why insist on a category as a useful distinction when there is nothing in it?

We agree on the future being predetermined with the exception of probabilistic quantum processes - if those don't turn out to be predetermined as well. We're only 'arguing' about semantics.


"Whether illegal or prescription, therapeutic or recreational, how do mind-altering substances fit into your 'free will' theory?"

Nothing so grandiose as a theory. But you can't give consent for sex or contracts while under enough influence of mind-altering substances, so I would include being under the influence as something that would prevent a choice being considered a freely willed one.

We agree on the future being predetermined with the exception of probabilistic quantum processes - if those don't turn out to be predetermined as well.

I gather we're all guessing. My guess is that the probabilistic emergence of quarks within infinite possibilities is colored by their associations within matter, allowing for continuity.

It's interesting that protons persist for many billions of years, while quarks are so short-lived that they're undetectable except for their effects.

"I would include being under the influence as something that would prevent a choice being considered a freely willed one."

Perhaps... unless the decision to get wasted is an exercise of free will based on a desire to become non compos mentis, in which case, free will objective accomplished.

It's turtles all the way down.

What IS free, then? Nothing, right? Why insist on a category as a useful distinction when there is nothing in it?

You mean like deities? That's an empty category. So, yes, I think "free" also is an empty category. I think that's the entire discussion in one sentence. It does seem we're on the same page.

Proton decay half-life is estimated to be 10^34 years. So far more than "billions". I don't think there's a word for that number.

Proton decay half-life is estimated to be 10^34 years.

Proton decay has never been observed. Enormous unverified estimates of proton half-life have been hypothesized as filler for various theories.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proton_decay

All that aside, what I'm pointing to is the dramatic contrast between the manifest persistence of protons and the ephemerality of their constituent quarks, the latter interfacing finite materiality and infinite potentiality.

Spacetime, the matrix of perceived existence, is emergent within this interface. Organically evolving perception, including humankind with its vaunted cerebra, is a product of this emergence.

It's a leap to consider the transition from infinite possibilities to spacetime perception, yet that's precisely where the causal feedback required for free will must reside. Free will boils down to whether or not materiality (proton persistence) bears any influence on its ever present atemporal quantum emergence.

I'd argue that if it didn't, there'd be no persistence. And if it does, all the machinations of organic evolution are reflected in whatever comes next.

In the context of thousands of years of argument among the most brilliant of minds, I doubt these observations are likely to prove persuasive to those already convinced of their conclusions, but they do the job for me. And I'd like nothing more than to further refine them.

For THE correct answer, I turned to Copilot, MSFT's AI.

"Do people have free will?"

It responded thusly:

人々は自由意志を持っているのでしょうか？

この問いについては、科学者や哲学者の間で意見が分かれています。以下に、異なる立場からの視点を示します。

自由意志は存在しない: スタンフォード大学の神経生物学者であるロバート・サポルスキー氏は、40年以上にわたる研究を通じて、ほとんどの人間の行動は、私たちの意識的な制御を超えています。彼は、発作のような痙攣、細胞の分裂、心臓の鼓動と同様に、人々が選択する行動も無意識的に決まっていると結論づけています。彼は「私たちは自由意志を持っていない。私たちには存在しないものを私たちに帰せないでほしい」と述べています1。

自由意志は存在する: 一部の神経科学者や哲学者は、人間は少なくともある程度の自由意志を持っていると考えています。自由意志は、私たち自身を認識する方法に欠かせないものであり、達成の満足感や正しいことをしなかった際の恥を感じる要素です。

異なる視点: この議論は複雑であり、多くの視点が存在します。一部の研究者は、私たちが第一次の意志（欲望）と第二次の意志（実際に欲するもの）を区別できると主張しています2。

自由意志の存在については、個々の信念や文化によっても異なります。このテーマは、哲学的な議論や科学的な研究が進行中であり、完全な回答はまだ得られていないと言えるでしょう。

It responded thusly:

人々は自由意志を持っているのでしょうか？

この問いについては、科学者や哲学者の間で意見が分かれています。以下に、異なる立場からの視点を示します。

自由意志は存在しない: スタンフォード大学の神経生物学者であるロバート・サポルスキー氏は、40年以上にわたる研究を通じて、ほとんどの人間の行動は、私たちの意識的な制御を超えています。彼は、発作のような痙攣、細胞の分裂、心臓の鼓動と同様に、人々が選択する行動も無意識的に決まっていると結論づけています。彼は「私たちは自由意志を持っていない。私たちには存在しないものを私たちに帰せないでほしい」と述べています1。

自由意志は存在する: 一部の神経科学者や哲学者は、人間は少なくともある程度の自由意志を持っていると考えています。自由意志は、私たち自身を認識する方法に欠かせないものであり、達成の満足感や正しいことをしなかった際の恥を感じる要素です。

異なる視点: この議論は複雑であり、多くの視点が存在します。一部の研究者は、私たちが第一次の意志（欲望）と第二次の意志（実際に欲するもの）を区別できると主張しています2。

自由意志の存在については、個々の信念や文化によっても異なります。このテーマは、哲学的な議論や科学的な研究が進行中であり、完全な回答はまだ得られていないと言えるでしょう。

Well you have to admit, it’s hard to argue with that.

人々は自由意志を持っているのでしょうか

Most enlightening!

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