Subject: Re: Is NATO figuring it out?
And I'm sure they have lots of plans for either naval escorts or ground troops seizing territory along the shoreline - or both - in order to respond to it. But we're not doing any of that, because we don't want to bear the costs that would inevitably come from it. Which is why we're not prepared to respond to this rather obvious countermeasure. And Trump is asserting that no one ever gamed out that Iran might attack energy networks in other Gulf States. I think that's untrue, of course - I have no doubt the military has gamed that out as well - but the fact that Trump is claiming that none of his team ever discussed it indicates that the current operation wasn't prepared for it.

Let's learn from Marine Lt. General Paul van Riper:

https://warontherocks.com/2015...

Red team leader Van Riper knew his country’s political leadership could not accept this, which he believed would lead the blue forces to directly intervene. Since the George W. Bush administration had recently announced the “preemption doctrine,” Van Riper decided that as soon as a U.S. Navy carrier battle group steamed into the Gulf, he would “preempt the preemptors” and strike first. Once U.S. forces were within range, Van Riper’s forces unleashed a barrage of missiles from ground-based launchers, commercial ships, and planes flying low and without radio communications to reduce their radar signature. Simultaneously, swarms of speedboats loaded with explosives launched kamikaze attacks. The carrier battle group’s Aegis radar system — which tracks and attempts to intercept incoming missiles — was quickly overwhelmed, and 19 U.S. ships were sunk, including the carrier, several cruisers, and five amphibious ships. “The whole thing was over in five, maybe ten minutes,” Van Riper said.

The red team had struck a devastating blow against the blue team. The impact of the OPFOR’s ability to render a U.S. carrier battle group — the centerpiece of the U.S. Navy — militarily worthless stunned most of the MC ’02 participants. Van Riper described the mood as “an eerie silence. Like people didn’t really know what to do next.” Blue team leader Bell admitted that the OPFOR had “sunk my damn navy,” and had inflicted “an extremely high rate of attrition, and a disaster, from which we all learned a great lesson.”

Our forces in the Gulf are already in harm's way; I'm not sure why you keep returning to the point that we're unwilling to risk our ships.

Let's continue and look at the actual after-action report:
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news...
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/docu...
From Red JTF-South's position Blue JTF's attack was not rapid, nor was it decisive. After the introduction of flexible deterrent option (FOO) forces Blue required another 23 days (12 July-3 August) to move sufficient forces into theater and to commence offensive actions. At the end of hostilities Red ITF-South still retained its control of the southern Red mainland.

In other words, they've gamed out a lot of what you're saying.

Here's a WaPo summary: https://www.washingtonpost.com...
When Van Riper told the story of the Millennium Challenge to journalist Malcolm Gladwell, he said the Blue Forces were stuck in their mode of thinking. Their vastly superior technology included advanced intelligence matrices and an Operational Net Assessment that identified OPFOR vulnerabilities and what Van Riper was most likely to do next, selected from a predetermined range of possible scenarios.

Basically, the Blue Forces relied heavily on the technology. When the United States took out the fictional Iran’s microwave towers and fiber optics, they expected Van Riper’s forces to use satellite and cell phones that could be monitored.

Not a chance.

Van Riper instead used motorcycle couriers, messages hidden in prayers called over the muezzin, and even coded lighting systems on his airfields, all of which were old tactics employed during World War II.

The Pentagon got a rude reminder that the enemy gets a vote. After initially balking, to their credit, they learned.