Subject: Re: Winning Looks a Lot Like Losing...
The most likely scenario is the seizing of Kharg island which will have ramifications on Iran's oil exports (which would drop to zero). Iran's partners won't like that either.

Do you know where Kharg Island is? It’s above the Strait. It will not, in an of itself, have any impact on the military possibilities of opening the strait. It could have an economic impact in Iran, for sure (not “zero”, they have four other, but much smaller terminals for oil), so only if they would come to the table to negotiate an opening would it work.

But — how would that work? If we are to take that terminal there would surely be significant damage, both to the terminal and casualties on our side. We can’t just “bomb it from the air” because then they have no incentive to negotiate anyway. So the question is, do you think that taking control of the terminals, including the attendant damage, would be enough to convince Iran to “open the Strait”, given that we have destroyed significant infrastructure all over the country already and they have not moved from their basic positions (see the Ten Points in the negotiating document).

So: if we bomb it from the air, they have nothing, and no reason not to continue asymmetric strategies (including guerrilla tactics on shipping.)

If we invade by land and try to hold, we invite significant casualties and continue to have no support from anyone else because, why?

This is a “grasping at straws” strategy, popular among Trump supporters because there is nothing else and they can’t follow an idea through to its obvious and logical conclusion *(see: the entire nonsense of this “war”).

Or tell me: how to we “take” Kharg Island, keep it intact, and do so without allies and without casualties?