Subject: Re: Kuwait Air Defenses Down US Jets
Why do you think Trump and Bibi keep saying it's up to the Iranians themselves now? We've no interest in replacing Tehran's government; they have to do that themselves.

Again, the strategic goals are
(a) Severely degrade/Eliminate Iran's ability to project power and/or destabilize the region
(b) Further isolate China and remove one of their vassal states, further putting pressure on their energy supplies.

Both objectives appear to have been met.

Not really.

Oh, sure, while the bombs are actually falling, yes. But once we stop bombing them, Iran will very quickly again have the ability to project power and/or destabilize the region. Why wouldn't they? They're a large country sitting on rich oil supplies. After we blow up their stuff, they'll rebuild their military. And why does removing Khameini remove one of their vassal states? Iran has traditionally been more of a client of Russia, not China - their relationship with China has been more economic and developmental, and that's very likely going to continue with Khameini's successor.

One might say there's a Door #3 where she does the exact same things and we just sit there and do nothing about it. Is that right? Don't think that's an option here.

It's highly likely Rubio and co. have shown her what's behind Doors Number 1 and 2 and told her that it's in her best interest to take Door #2.

As a general matter, people who rise to the upper tier of repressive authoritarian states are not cowards who fear for their lives. They tend to be ruthless folk who are quite willing to accept that with power comes the risk that you might end up in a nasty end. So I don't think that Rodriguez is quaking in her boots over the fact that Rubio is telling about Door #1 - or that his threats are likely to make her do anything other than the choices she would make based on the vast array of domestic and global interests, factions, and threats that shaped Maduro's choices before her.

And even if she were the exceedingly rare "authoritarian shrinking violet," it's highly likely that the generals and military leaders who are right there with her have told her it's in her best interests to take Door #3. Because they don't care whether she gets taken away in a helicopter, and their desire to take Door #3 is completely unaffected by what Rubio wants or says. And, again, they're much much closer than Rubio - and they care a lot more than Rubio does.

No offense, but you're standing in the forest telling me about the tree canopy while you bend over and study some fern growing a foot off the ground.

It's so funny, because I believe the exact same thing is true about you. You're focusing entirely on the fern growing a foot off the ground (Maduro being gone and the U.S. directing oil sales), and ignoring the entire forest (that 100% of the people that currently are directing Venezuelan foreign policy are the same people that were in the regime prior to our operation - and that all of the geopolitical factors that led Venezuela to be receptive to China are unchanged). You keep pointing to ridiculously small changes in Venezuelan policy as if they mean something significant has changed, even though the Venezuelan government is virtually identical (save the top job) from what it was before.

Just look at oil. From your own link, we're still going to send most of Venezuela's oil supplies to China. Because the oil flows are shaped by global economic factors and geopolitical forces that are wholly unrelated to what Rubio wants. The oil has to get sold or the country devolves into chaos, and there's nowhere else really to sell it. The article is just some hopeful spin, generated by AI (did you look at what the "beijingpost" actually is? It's just AI slop), that pretends that this is somehow materially detrimental to China. It's not.

Virtually nothing's changed in Venezuela, so very little is going to change in Venezuela's global relations. We don't yet know what's coming in Iran, but many (most) of the likely outcomes are going to be either a continuation of the existing regime in substantially the same form (Venezuela model) or a shift in power to a military dictatorship run directly by the Revolutionary Guard. Neither of which are especially likely to be any less favorably disposed to China than the Khameini administration was. There is a small chance that some substantially different government might arise, based on what the Iranian people want - but that's very unlikely, since the existing regime and the IGRC pretty much have all of the power in the country. Bombing them isn't any more likely to lead to them being replaced than Israel's managed to replace Hamas in Gaza. They're the ones that have nearly all the guns, and there's no alternative - so they'll stay in charge.



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