Subject: Re: BRK, the VL is out, if you can read it.
This is the key weakness of value investing. In short, they chicken out when there is no margin of safety, because future earnings are so unpredictable as they were for the tech companies you cited. No way you could project Netflix's earnings, for example, without considering all the bad things that could have happened. Or Amazon's without knowing AWS will be a money machine. Of course people buying for "bad reasons" were buying on hope and faith in unknown future good news, visionary leaders (Bezos eg) etc. Not based on financial statements.
Damodaran tried to capture this in numbers using "growth assets" added to their balance sheets but ultimately it's an exercise in futility to predict earnings when the landscape is ever-shifting. Dispersion in future returns overwhelms the trend line.
Obviously I don't know what the answer is, and it's a problem even Graham recognized, but the world moved at a snail's pace in his time compared to ours. Now the only stocks value investors can comfortably buy are somewhat slow growers / no growers. Fast growers are so popular that they will forever be too expensive by numbers (considering MOS) and yet with forever better returns than value stocks. Partly because of the demand (similar to crypto) and partly because they can raise money at will to develop or buy any new potential money machines.
Hey, nobody said it was easy to predict what will happen to a firm. The good news is that you don't have to be able to predict the future earnings of very many firms, and precision isn't needed.
As for growth being the right way to go, it's certainly a compelling narrative, but it's unfortunately contradicted by decades, centuries, of empirical evidence to the contrary. Sure, a growing firm is worth more than a creeper, for sure. No argument. And a few of the super-fast-growers will be the biggest winners of all. The problem? To overgeneralize, a growing firm is (say) worth twice as much but usually costs three times as much, so the average forward return is lower than for a middle-of-the-road firm. People always overpay for growth (on average), it's like a law of investing thermodynamics. It's quite hard to identify the few among the very rapid growers that will succeed, and the average is working strongly against you, so it's like being on the wrong side of a table at a casino. I'd prefer to be on the dealer's side, where the odds are in my favour.
Heck, who did better in the last decade, Warren Buffett or Cathie Wood? The king of boring, or the queen of zoom?
Nah, keep it simple. Buy something that's trading at a low multiple of its plainly foreseeable (by you) future value, and sit back. If you feel like being fancy, re-evaluate that ranking from time to time and switch horses if you like...as Manlobbi advocates.
Perhaps the most compelling thing about Berkshire as an investment is its relative predictability. The rate of return may not be outlandish, but the unlikely extreme outcomes to the downside (and upside) are not much different from the most likely outcomes. It certainly isn't always compellingly cheap, but when it is, it's obvious.
Jim